Abstract:D espite the nine-year Drug Offensive against drug abuse,a nd the increasing expenditures to enforce the laws against cannabis use,a nd the seizure of large plantations of cannabis plants,t here is evidence that the use of cannabis is increasing in Australia, with stable black-market prices. Recent government data are used to estimate the conservative cost of druglawe nforcement against cannabis use of $329m in 1991−92. Alternatives to the existing regime are examined, including expiation, decriminalisation, and legalisation.
Cannabis Use in Australia
Recent data on Australian cannabis use [1] show a slight increase in the number of Australians aged 14 and over who have ever used cannabis.T he survey also provides information on the percentages of Australians who have ever been offered cannabis,t hose who have used cannabis in the last year, and those who would try cannabis if it were offered by a "trusted friend". The results are summarised in Table 1 . 2 The Table shows that the proportion of Australians who have ever been offered, who have ever tried, and who would try a friend'sc annabis,i ss table and perhaps slightly increasing over the sixyear period.
Data on illicit drug use from the Australian Federal Police (AFP)i nclude black-market prices [4] . The price ranges are quoted for wholesale and retail
1. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Drug LawR eform Conference, "Cannabis and Narcotics: Problems and Prospects for Decriminalisation,"u nder the auspices of The LawSociety of New South Wales,onOctober 23, 1993 . transactions by drug type." Annual totals of illicit drugs seized cannot be regarded in isolation as a measure of enforcement performance,a ny more than they can be said to be indicative of the relative availability of illicit drugs," [4] but together with the price data, it is possible to conclude that cannabis availability is unchanging over the two-year period 1989 and 1990.
The wholesale price of domestic cannabis leaf fell in the higher wholesale price range (between $4,000 and $7,000 per kilogram), but rose at lower wholesale prices (between $2,000 and $2,500 per kilogram), possibly due to localised shortages.T he retail price (between $8 and $50 per gram) was considered stable [4] . There was a ten-fold increase in seizures between 1989 and 1990 (to 2.477 tonnes of cannabis tops,s eeds,a nd resin) but since this is not at all reflected in higher prices at the wholesale or retail level, the conclusion that "Cannabis products continued to be freely available in all states" [4] is not surprising.
Of the total 2.477 tonnes of cannabis seized, 88% was imported cannabis,and 12% domestically grown, but this in no way should be taken to reflect the proportions of supply,s ince there was a general trend towards smaller,b etter concealed domestic plantations,w ith increased imports from Papua New Guinea [4] .
Drug-Law-Enforcement (DLE)Expenditures
There are several components to the social costs associated with drug use and laws: the public expenditures by governments,t he private expenditures of individual households,a nd the non-monetary burdens imposed on society.
Researchf our years ago [5] 3 considered the social costs of Australian drug policy in 1987−88: estimates were made of the public and private expenditures on the criminal-justice system and the health-care system, and the further,non-monetary net costs associated with the Australian drug laws. Using a cost−benefit approach, broadly related to the drug-policy analysts' "harm reduction,"i tw as argued that control and regulation was preferable to prohibition [5] .
Since 1987−88 the total population has grown by over 1.2m people,o r7 %, and there has also been price inflation of 21% [8] . Rather than updating simply by adjusting by 30% to reflect the larger population and inflated 1991 dollar,weshall consider eachcomponent cost.
The 1987−88 drug-law-enforcement (DLE)e xpenditures were conservatively estimated at $123.2m [9] , based on the expenditures on the AFP and the state police forces,t he National Crime Authority (NCA), the Australian Customs Service (ACS), and the expenditures on prisons and courts.T he estimate included 60% of the NCA budget, and pro-rated the other budgets by the proportion of officers directly engaged in DLE.T his is very conservative, since it ignored the proportion of officers engaged in coping with drug-related crimes,s ucha sp roperty crimes committed by drug users.M oreover,i t ignored the capital expenditures on prisons,t he expenditures on legal aid, the expenditures on private legal representation, and the costs of time and delays for non-forensic participants in the courts.
After the adjustments 4 to the AFP and state police force estimates (but not to the NCA or the ACS estimates) and after adding estimates for the capital expenditures on prisons and the expenditures on legal aid, the revised estimate [5] of the expenditures on DLE in 1987−88 was $320m, still only 13% of the total expenditures of $2,451m for Police,C ourts,a nd Prisons obtained from top-down estimates [10] , or a smaller 9.8% of the expenditure figure of $3,252m from government estimates [11] . 5 The total current and capital expenditure on lawa nd order for 1990−91 was $4,578m [11] , and so an unchanged 9.8% of this would be $449m. 6 We adjust the 1987−88 figures for the DLE expenditures associated with the AFP,t he 4 . The main adjustment [5] was multiplying the earlier estimates [9] by a factor of 2.5, whichw as obtained by imputing a proportion of 40% of the Australian prisoners on 30 June 1988 who had been convicted for various kinds of theft (robbery,e xtortion, breakand-enter,f raud and misappropriation, receiving,a nd other theft), as having committed the thefts to support purchases of illicit drugs at the high, black-market prices.4 4.1% of all 5,431 prisoners had been charged or convicted on theft offences.
5. Government expenditures [11, 8] on "public order and safety," broken down by current and capital, by jurisdiction, and by major expenditure group.s how that total capital and current government expenditures on lawc ourts and legal services,p olice services,a nd prisons and corrective services were (in current dollars) $3,252m in 1987−88, rising to $4,847m in 1991−92, an average annual growth rate in nominal terms of 10.4%. It is not immediately clear how to reconcile [10] and [11] , whichinclude outlays on police colleges,p olice training,p olice laboratories; legal representation and advice on behalf of the government and others,e xpenditures on crown prosecutions,t rustees. They exclude,h owever,o utlays associated with industrial lawa nd tribunals and appeal boards associated with industrial lawa nd tribunals and appeal boards that can be classified to special purpose categories,a nd residential child-care institutions that are not places of secure detention. ACS,t he state police and the recurrent expenditures and legal aid expenditures associated with the courts by 30% to reflect population growth and inflation. 7 We adjust the figures for prisons (recurrent and capital) by 48%, to reflect inflation and the 20% increase in drug-related and theft incarcerations.W eu se the higher estimate of the NCA expenditures derived above.T he results are presented in Table 2 . The total of $450.4m for DLE expenditures in 1991−92 represents an increase of 40% over the estimates for 1987−88, or a 16.3% increase in real terms.I t represents only 9.9% of the $4,578m for total Australian expenditure on law and order [11] , and so is a very conservative proportion.
Cannabis-Law-Enforcement Expenditures
What proportion of our estimated expenditure can be attributed to cannabis? We havear ange of proportions: seizures (78% of total seizures), value of turnover in the blackm arkets for illicit drugs (73%, [9] ), proportions of the population who have ever used cannabis (91% of all illicit drugs) or who have used cannabis in the past year (87% of all illicit drugs), numbers of arrests by illicit drug (83% for cannabis). 8 So the choice appears to be between 73% (low, because of the high value of imported black-market heroin and cocaine) and 6 . Sucha ni ncrease is not merely from the effects of price inflation: the number of prisoners on 30 June 1991 was 15,021, including 6,534 (or 43.5%) associated with various kinds of theft, and 1,364 (or 9%) associated with drug offences.T he numbers associated with theft had risen by 20% since 1987−88. The NCA's budget rose by 20% per year in real terms over the three years 1987−88 to 1990−91 [12] , whichr esulted in a budget of $26.9m in 1987−88 dollars,o r$ 33.1m in 1991 dollars.6 0% of this corresponds to $19.9m.
7. This proportion will be excessive for some of these expenditures (sucha sc ertain state police forces) and insufficient for others (suchasthe AFP), but is on average appropriate. See the numbers of officers by state police force and the AFP over past years [8] .
91% (high, because of the availability of domestically grown cannabis).
We use the lower proportion of 73%, 9 and arrive at a figure of $329m for the year 1991−92. As we remarked above,b oth the proportion and the base are conservative estimates.B ut what does suchafi gure mean? What it doesn't mean is that if cannabis disappeared (because,s ay,o fad isease that destroyed all cannabis plants in the world) then expenditures on lawa nd order in Australia would soon fall by that amount, since so long as other drugs were in demand but prohibited, officers,c ourts,a nd prisons would still be necessary to attempt to enforce the law.
If there were a reduction in the severity of the prohibition against cannabis (sucha st he South Australian expiation system [13, 14, 15] or the Australian Capital Territory (ACT)system of on-the-spot fines [16] ) to what extent would the expenditures estimated above fall? First, there was a clear fall in drugrelated offences after the laww as changed in South Australia in 1987 [13] . This is also seen in the figures on recorded drug offences [1]. 10 If a similar fall in absolute numbers had occurred across Australia, the number of drug offences would have fallen by 72,280, or more than the total number of recorded drug offences for the whole country in 1990. Ap roportionate fall in numbers would have led to a fall of over 70% in recorded drug offences.
Second, there was a small or negligible fall in the workloads on South 9. It is true that the black-market price for cannabis is nothing like as high as the price for such" addictive" drugs as heroin, but this is because the demand for heroin, at least amongst the habitual users who consume most of it, is muchl ess elastic than the demand for softer drugs,s ucha sc annabis.T he other side of that particular coin is that it is the consumers of "addictive" drugs who commit most of the drug-related theft: the high, black-market prices cannot be met by habitual users from legal sources of income. So a disproportionately small number of drug-related thefts are committed by offenders who have not been using "addictive" drugs.Adisproportionately small number of prisoners who have been using legal drugs and cannabis only have committed drugrelated thefts.T he expenditures on prisons,t hen, should be more heavily accounted for by heroin and cocaine.
10. Sutton and Sarre [13] report that "rate of police detections of minor cannabis offences continued to rise under the cannabis expiation system ...
[but] the rate of increase (11% p.a.) was less than the long-term rate of increase (25% p.a.)" although they doubt a direct link between the detection rate on the introduction of the scheme.S outh Australia had the largest fall in the drug offence rate,f rom 596 per 100,000 population in 1985 to 178 per 100,000 population in 1988 [1] . This occurred mainly with the introduction of the cannabis expiation scheme.
Australian courts in the nine months after the laww as changed [13] , since almost half the offenders did not payt heir expiation bills by the due date.I t wasc oncluded that, with no change in the law, u nless substantial effort was made to increase the rate of payment, the impact of the initiative on the courts would not be significant [13] .
These observations suggest that, first, individually reducing the penalties for cannabis,w hile other prohibited drugs remain for whicht here are continuing demands and black-market transactions,w ill not reduce public expenditures by much, if at all. Second, that alternatives sucha st he South Australian initiative maylead to few if any cost savings in the criminal justice system, at least at first. There are,h owever,c lear gains to individuals who are apprehended and no longer risk large penalties and the possibility of criminal records,and there will be other reductions in wider social costs.
Other Social Costs Related to Cannabis Use.
Several recent studies [16, 17, 18, 19] have canvassed the scientific literature for adverse pharmacological, physiological, and psychological effects caused by sustained, moderate cannabis use. 11 Suchi ll effects,i fs ignificant, would result in additional social costs.D espite the strongly held beliefs of some that "cannabis is clearly a dangerous substance leading to a range of physical and psychiatric conditions that should be avoided" [17] , the conclusions of many medical researchers are that cannabis is not a dangerous substance,a nd that, used in moderation, it is physiologically less toxic than many regularly consumed legal substances,suchasalcohol and tobacco.
Additional social costs include "lacko fr espect for the institutions of justice; the maintenance of lucrative illicit markets and any attendant organisedcrime involvement, violence or corruption; the costs arising from the criminalisation of individuals [users and dealers]; and the foregone (sic)value of other uses to whichr esources currently engaged in drug commerce and DLE could be put" [17] . We donot attempt to quantify these social costs here, but note that they derive from the illicit nature of cannabis use,n ot from the cannabis use itself,and so would fall or vanish if cannabis use were no longer prohibited [20, 21] . 12 
Supplyand Demand
11. Several studies [16, 17, 19, 20] also summarised the findings and recommendations of over twenty Australian and foreign inquiries into the desirability of reforming cannabis laws.
12. These costs are "extrinsic" costs,both direct (to the user) and indirect (to others), but not "intrinsic" to the drug itself [21] .
Supply
Of concern, given the evident lacko fe ffectiveness of the laws prohibiting cannabis use,i st he illicit distribution system, with its unscrupulous entrepreneurs.G iven the fact that some proportion -probably large,g iven the relatively low value-density 13 of cannabis leaf,w hichl eads to greater risks of detection as the drug crosses national frontiers -of the drug is grown in Australia, the high mark-ups 14 down the distribution chain are a potential temptation to Australian residents to break the law.
With a conservative average yield of 500 grams of cannabis per plant, Queensland'sa nnual consumption of cannabis (40.5 tonnes,b y8 3,600 frequent regular users,a tas treet value of $361.6m) could be satisfied by about 81,000 mature plants per year [17] . But Queensland police seize on average 40,000 to 50,000 plants annually without any discernible market effect, whichimplies a muchlarger crop.
Queensland supply might be significant in Australia, 15 with three-quarters of the state'sc rop meeting out-of-state demand [17] . If these conclusions are correct, then the Queensland cannabis industry is worth $632.8m (at retail prices of around $9 per gram and an annual crop of 70.9 tonnes) or $283.6m (at wholesale prices of around $4,000 per kg), comparable with the values of the commercial sugar and wheat crops in Queensland.
The relative sizes of the home-grown crop and the "commercial" crop can be examined by analysing prosecutions for cultivation: cultivations of ten or fewer plants accounted for 72.5% of offences,b ut only 6.2% of total plants seized [17] . This suggests that casual growers are not significant suppliers. Of more concern is the network of supply,i ncluding the "commercial" growers.
The Queensland study [17] corroborated analysis of the illicit heroin distribution network [22] , at least in its lower,A ustralian levels.F rom the top,as maller number of criminal/large-scale growers,t hen a larger group of medium-scale/regional growers with smaller plantations,t hen a large number of cannabis consumers,s ome of whom are user/growers and 13 . Dollars per litre of the drug as transported. Cannabis oil and cannabis resin, neither of whichi sb elieved to be produced in Australia [17] , are more attractive for smugglers, given their higher value-densities.
14. One example: the ounce-dealer made a gross return -sales/purchases -of 215%, and the "hotel dealer" (selling "sticks" or "foils") a gross return of 200% [17] . It is likely that the returns to growers are even higher,g iven the risks of detection of large-scale plantations.
15. Four reasons: (a)at ightening of DLE in the southern states,e specially New South Wales; (b)m ore favourable growing conditions,e specially in far north Queensland; (c) market perceptions that Queensland cannabis is more potent than southern crops; and (d)the presence of established criminal networks with southern market connections.
user/dealers.T he local, Queensland networks mayb es eparate from the national networks,with the consumers awa y in the southern states.
Despite significant seizures of foreign cannabis arriving in Australia and detection and destruction of apparently large Australian plantations,t here has been little if any effect on the supply of the drug,a sr eflected in stable street prices.T his is the strongest evidence for the resilience of the supply side of this blackmarket in the face of determined lawenforcement. How the supply network would adjust to changes in the laws relating to cannabis possession and use,c eteris paribus,r emains to be seen, but a fall in profitability,w ith no change in the risk of apprehension might be expected to make supply of the drug less attractive to the unscrupulous entrepreneurs.
Demand
As noted above,t he price elasticity of demand 16 for cannabis is higher than for more "addictive" drugs sucha sh eroin, whichm eans that there is less pressure on would-be cannabis consumers to commit property crimes to pay for their drug,w ith correspondingly lower black-market prices,c eteris paribus.B ut a more highly elastic demand means that a lower price,c et. par., will result in a larger demand for the drug,a lthough, given the relatively benign effects of cannabis on the user,this should not be of concern, except to those who would prohibit its use at any social cost. Relaxation of the prohibition, in South Australia and elsewhere,h as not, as we discuss below,r esulted in large if any increases in cannabis use [3, 15, 19, 24] , despite falls in street prices.
Policy
We assert that the appropriate measure for judging policy is not the numbers of users,t he quantity of drug used, or even the diversion of society'ss carce resources to DLE.R ather,e achp olicy should be judged by its ability or potential to reduce net social costs or "harm" [2, 3, 19, 20, 21] , in particular the "extrinsic" costs associated with prohibitionist laws.W eh avef ocused above on the DLE costs associated with the prohibition on cannabis use.B enson and Rasmussen [25] argue that a crime-control policy focusing on drug crime will not serve as an effective means of controlling property crime,b ecause increased DLE efforts,with fixed budgets for lawenforcement, will reduce the risk of apprehension for those who commit property crimes,w hichi nt urn mayi ncrease the incidence of property crimes,i ncluding those that are drugrelated. This suggests that cannabis lawe nforcement efforts mayb e counterproductive,w hen the aim is to reduce social costs,i ncluding overall levels of criminal behaviour.I ndeed, the evidence presented above suggests that suche fforts are quite ineffective at preventing use of cannabis in Australia, but are expensive for the community,b oth in terms of public expenditures and of non-monetary costs.
There are three broad alternatives to the existing regime: (a)e xpiation, (b) decriminalisation, and (c)l egalisation. 17 Recently,G ermany,I taly,a nd Colombia have moved towards decriminalisation, but for historical data we must look at South Australia, the Netherlands,and several U.S.states,which relaxed the prohibition against cannabis use in the past twenty years.
What does the South Australian initiative suggest the effect of reducing the penalties for cannabis possession and use -and hence the black-market price -would be? Despite the easing of controls over cannabis use in South Australia since 1987, there has been no significant rise in the numbers of cannabis users [13, 14, 15] . 18 Similar results are reported for Ohio,C alifornia, Michigan, and the Netherlands [3, 15, 19, 24] . Moreover,t here were apparently significant reductions in the cost of DLE in California and other states,o wing to the lower rate of arrests,p rocessing,a nd imprisonment [15, 19, 24, 26] , something whichSouth Australia and the ACT mayyet enjoy.
But the lacko far eduction in South Australian DLE costs [13] raises a further question: with no increases in numbers of users or quantity used, why not move to decriminalisation, with no penalties for personal use and possession, and so eliminate the remaining DLE costs associated with recalcitrant offenders paying their fines? Af urther move to legalisation of cannabis would release at least $329m per year Australia-wide for consumption or investment for the future.
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